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An integrative process model of organizational failure 
 
Abstract 
In spite of the perennial interest in organisational failure and burgeoning streams of research, 
much of the existing literature has developed in isolation across multiple social science 
disciplines. Consequently, this has obscured the past accomplishments and allowed confusion to 
persist. The review and synthesis of the literature across scholarly fields led to the development 
of an integrative process model of causes, stages of decline leading to failure and consequences 
of organisational failure. The proposed integrated framework brings together an array of 
theoretical explanations for the causes of business failure. The study uncovered unchartered 
territories and unresolved issues which have the potential to further illuminate our understanding 
of the subject. The study offers a number of contributions to theory and practice.  Keywords: 
business failure; organizational failure; causes; processes; consequences 
Introduction  
Over the past three decades, liquidation, discontinuance, bankruptcy and mortality studies, like 
many other branches of management, have coined specialised nomenclatures and approaches to 
describe organisational failure and its consequences (see Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004; Evans & 
Borders, 2014; Cochran, Darrat & Elkhal, 2006). An unfortunate outcome has been that many 
non-specialists have lost touch with the advances made and key debates in the field (Mellahi & 
Wilkinson, 2010).  
Over time, the burgeoning stream of research has become increasingly complex and fragmented 
across multiple social science disciplines including accounting, strategy, organisation studies, 
entrepreneurship and business history. Consequently, the lack of integration has not only failed 
to stimulate cross-fertilisation but also obscured the past accomplishments made in addressing 
the fundamental questions such as “why do firms fail?” and “what happens when firms fail?”  
Against this backdrop, confusion has emerged and the field is also “getting bigger without 
necessarily maturing” (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2010, p. 532; Walsh & Bartunek, 2011). Although 
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past studies have called for a much integrated discussion on the causes of business failure 
(Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004), to date, scholars have largely sidestepped the key issue.  
The main purpose of this study is to review and synthesise the literature on the antecedents and 
consequences of organisational failure. The study makes at least two main contributions to the 
literature. First, in contrast to the much of the existing literature, this study develops an 
integrated process model which links the antecedents, stages of decline and consequences of 
organisational failure. In addition, the review of the literature helps in clarifying the various 
facets of the subject. It also led to the identification of a number of unchartered territories and 
unresolved issues with potential to further illuminate our understanding of the subject.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section sets out the definition of 
organisational failure and defines the scope of the review. This is then followed by an 
examination of the existing state of knowledge in the field. On the basis of the review and 
synthesis, the final section outlines directions for future research.   
Defining organisational failure 
Over the years, some scholars have viewed organisational failure as either the discontinuance of 
the business (Hamilton, 2006; Walsh & Bartunek, 2011) or discontinuance of ownership of the 
business (Everett & Watson, 1998). Discontinuance of ownership may occur when the owner 
makes a decision to offload the firm and its assets to potential buyers or investors. One of the 
problems of viewing business failure as a discontinuance of business is that it primarily views 
failure as entry and exit rates (Everett & Watson, 1998). Many businesses often cease operations 
after the owners retire and therefore to equate such events to failure may not be an accurate 
reflection (Everett & Watson, 1998). In this context, organisational failure is defined as a 
situation where the firm ceases operations and loses its identity due to inability to respond and 
adapt to changes in the external environment in a timely fashion (Cameron, Sutton & Whetten, 
1988; Hager, Galaskiewicz, Bielefeld & Pins, 1996). In other words, organisational failure refers 
to “the actual demise of the organization when an entire company goes out of business ... the 
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organization completely ceases to exist” (Marks & Vansteenkiste, 2008, p. 810). This definition 
excludes studies on firms experiencing temporary performance problems and then generates a 
turnaround.  
Scope of the review 
In order to ensure a wider coverage of the literature, we replicated the systematic literature 
review approach advanced by Webster and Watson (2002) and Short (2009), and used by past 
reviewers such as Short, Ketchen, Shook and Ireland (2010). To assemble the literature, 
keywords such as discontinuance, insolvency, mortality, death, exit, failure, bankruptcy, 
liquidation, closure and setbacks, which have all been used to refer to organisational failure, 
were employed to search electronic databases such as Scopus, ProQuest, EBSCO Business 
Source Complete, Emerald, ScienceDirect, ISI Web of Knowledge and JSTOR. This approach 
was particularly useful in identifying and tracing past studies. The preliminary search resulted in 
the identification of a large number of articles which focused on the broad themes of failure 
including business, performance, service, system, operations and strategic failures. In order to 
further narrow down the voluminous number of studies with the general theme, additional 
keywords were employed in combinations (e.g. “failure”, “closure”, “bankruptcy”, “mortality” 
and “exit”). This process, in tandem with reading the abstracts and introductions of the articles, 
led to further elimination of studies outside the scope. This process paved the way for including 
studies where the focal firm ceases operations. In addition to the search of articles published in 
academic journals, working papers, a number of book chapters and conference proceedings were 
also examined for their inclusions to help ensure a comprehensive coverage of the literature. 
Thus, the study encompasses insights across multiple disciplines such as organisation studies, 
strategy and entrepreneurship to enrich our understanding of the current state of knowledge. 
Based on synthesis of the literature, an array of internal (firm-level) and external factors were 
identified which interacts to precipitate business failure. As outlined in Figure 1, these factors 
also influence the consequences of business failure. Below, we tease out the array of scholarly 
works uncovered.  
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------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
Organisational failure: An organising framework  
The review demonstrated that the theoretical and empirical research on the antecedents of 
organisational failure has tended to be polarised between the deterministic and voluntarist 
perspectives. A deterministic perspective in classical industrial organisation (IO) and 
organisation ecology (OE) literature suggests that managers are constrained by exogenous 
factors over which they have little or no control (Moulton, Thomas & Pruett, 1996). This 
suggests that organisational leaders are powerless in the face of changes in their environment. On 
the other hand, the voluntaristic perspective in organisation studies (OS) and organisational 
psychology (OP) literature suggests that managers’ actions, inactions and perceptions are the 
fundamental causes of organisational failure (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004; Nutt, 1999, 2002). 
Appendix 1 provides a summary of studies on organisational failure across multiple disciplines. 
The table sets out some key findings from each study. Below, we expand on these pivotal 
findings. 
Research on the external antecedents to organisational failure 
The classical IO traced its roots to the field of economics and assumed that a firm’s management 
team can influence neither industry conditions nor the firm’s own performance (Mellahi & 
Wilkinson, 2004). This perspective rests on the premise that firms cannot influence their own 
destiny. It argues that firms in an industry are affected by a range of industry-specific and 
environmental factors which lead to the process of “natural selection”, whereby firms that do not 
fit their environment are “selected out” and “die” (Tirole, 1988). Therefore, organisational 
failure is seen as an inevitable consequence of the process of “natural selection” and “survival of 
the fittest”. The following section outlines the variety of explanations for the causes.  
Environmental jolts explanations  
One of the main streams of research on the external factors is anchored in the Schumpeterian 
thesis of “creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 1942). According to Schumpeter (1942), jolts in the 
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external environment can generate waves of organisational failure. Environmental jolts are 
“transient perturbations whose occurrences are difficult to foresee and whose impacts on 
organisations are disruptive and potentially inimical” (Meyer, 1982, p. 515). Past studies have 
identified two kinds of environmental jolts—beneficial and hostile (Meyer, 1982). On one hand, 
beneficial jolts can provide a safe setting and conditions for firms to thrive (Covin & Slevin, 
1989). Beneficial jolts include a host of factors such as an increase in the customer population 
because of demographic changes, reduction in taxes, technological advancements and upswings 
in the business cycle, which may expand the economic opportunities for the population of firms 
within an economic niche (Venkataraman & Van de Ven, 1998). Consequently, such beneficial 
jolts can slow down or even avert the demise of firms (Carter & Van Auken, 2006).  
On the other hand, hostile jolts such as a sudden increase in natural disasters, unexpected tax 
hikes, a drastic shrinkage in the customer population and downswings in the business cycle, may 
shrink the economic opportunities for the population of firms within an economic niche (Covin 
& Slevin, 1989; Bradley, Aldrich, Shepherd & Wiklund, 2011). Scholars in this area have 
uncovered that such adverse business conditions are more likely to lead to business failure (El 
Hennawy & Morris, 1983; Platt, 1989). It has been suggested that market forces through 
measures such as technological change, deregulation and liberalisation enable more efficient 
firms to drive out their less efficient competitors (Tirole, 1988; Silverman, Nickerson & 
Freeman, 1997). For instance, Silverman et al. (1997) examined the mortality of large motor 
carriers in the U.S. inter-state for the hire trucking industry after deregulation and found 
increased mortality when firms did not adhere to operating policies consistent with transaction 
cost minimisation principles. Indeed, firms are more likely to close when the environment is 
volatile and unstable (Anderson & Tushman, 2001; Swaminathan, 1996).  
A large stream of research has suggested that organisation failure relates to the economic cycle 
(Platt, 1989; Platt & Platt, 1994; Carter & Van Auken, 2006). For instance, Bradley et al. (2010) 
conducted a study of Swedish manufacturing and technology firms and found that subsidiary 
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organisations have low mortality rates when compared to independent organisations, however, 
their mortality rates increase more rapidly during a severe economic downturn. As the economy 
worsens and recessions gather steam, the fortunes of big and small businesses often dwindle, 
which eventually precipitated their exits (Cornford, 2010).  
Unfavourable environmental factors 
In addition to the above, researchers have uncovered that a host of unfavourable environmental 
factors such as competitive intensity, falling prices, price wars, withdrawal of government 
subsidies and tax relief lead to high failure rates of firms (Covin, Slevin & Heeley, 2000; Baum 
& Mezias, 1992; Platzer, 2015; Jones & Bouamane, 2012). This stream of research suggests that 
such adverse conditions precipitate the closure of less adaptive firms. One of the richest streams 
of research has documented an array of company collapses in the global solar photovoltaic (PV) 
industry (e.g. Jones & Bouamane, 2012). Some of the explanations offered for the demise of 
multiple firms include intense global competitive rivalry stemming from the increasing number 
of new entrants and precipitous decline of global prices for solar panels (Committee on Energy 
and Commerce (CEC), 2012; Platzer, 2015). In the 2000s, in an attempt to create and sustain a 
competitive industry and promote clean-energy production, the Chinese government injected 
state aid to help local solar manufacturers gain a foothold in the industry (Platzer, 2015; CEC, 
2012). This has been instrumental in ushering in Chinese solar manufacturers to the global scene 
which coincided with the withdrawal of or reduction in subsidies by some Western countries 
(Platzer, 2015). Eventually, the cut-throat cost-cutting of Chinese rivals made it difficult for 
many Western-based solar companies to withstand the decreasing PV prices leading to the 
demise of multiple manufacturers in the industry (Platzer, 2015).  
Studies indicate that the reduction or withdrawal of government subsidies to firms in countries 
such as the United States and Germany further exacerbated the financial position of some of 
industry players and precipitated the demise of companies such as Solyndra in the US, and Solar 
Millennium and Odersun in Germany (Jones & Bouamane, 2012). Indeed, intense domestic 
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(Baum & Mezias, 1992) and international competition (Platzer, 2015) has been found to lead to 
higher failure rates. In a nutshell, these broad categories of perspectives contend that failed firms 
are somehow unfortunate victims of external circumstances such as sudden changes in the 
environment over which they have no control.  
Research on firm-level antecedents to organisational failure 
In recent decades, strategic management literature has shifted from viewing competitive 
advantage as primarily determined by environmental factors to internal organisational factors 
(Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). This shift has been attributed to the increasing recognition that 
sustained competitive advantage stems from the possession and utilisation of firm-specific 
resources and capabilities that are rare and cannot easily be imitated or substituted (Barney, 
1991). Around about the same time, a parallel shift has occurred in studies of organisational 
failure where some scholars have shifted from viewing failure as stemming from the process of 
“natural selection” towards examining firm-specific factors leading to business failure (Nutt, 
2002; Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004). At the cornerstone of this research is the suggestion that 
failure stems from the actions and inactions of decision-makers (Sheppard, 1994a, 1994b; Nutt, 
2002). The organisational antecedent perspective suggests that firm-specific factors to a greater 
extent are the primary causes of organisational failure (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2010). This section 
articulates the various streams of research on firm-level antecedents. 
Resource-based explanations  
A line of research rooted in the resource-based perspective of business failure (Hambrick & 
D’Aveni, 1992; Headd, 2003) has uncovered that the development, deployment and utilisation of 
resources and capabilities of firms are more likely to determine a firm’s ability to survive and 
avert ultimate failure. The review indicates that firm characteristics such as lack of quality 
resources and distinctive competencies are major contributory factors to failure (Carter & Van 
Auken, 2006; Headd, 2003). This also rests on the premise that talented executives enable their 
firms to phase out outdated skills and upgrade the expertise of workers in a timely manner to 
mitigate decline. Another interesting line of research has identified factors such as inability to 
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mobilise scarce human resources and lack of legitimacy (Fafchamps & Owens, 2009; Burger & 
Owens, 2013), depleted financial resources (Fernandez, 2008; Hager et al., 2004), lack of access 
to grants (Burger & Owens, 2013) and lack of connections to other organisations (Fernandez, 
2008) as common reasons for organisational failure (Hager et al., 2004). Firms well-endowed 
with abundant and quality financial resources and human capital are less likely to fail relative to 
those with fewer resources (Headd, 2003).  
Recent decades have witnessed a flourishing stream of research which suggests that failure may 
stem from the shrinking resources and expertise base of the firm (D'Aveni, 1990). Thus, 
organisational failure may stem from a lack of or declining financial and human capital to sustain 
a firm’s operation (D’Aveni, 1990, 1989a, 1989b; Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1992). However, firms 
with inferior resources and capabilities are also more likely to lose their ability to compete and 
eventually exit the market (D'Aveni, 1989a, 1989b; Knott & Posen, 2005). Another line of 
research has attributed failure to factors such as limited prior experience, mismanagement and 
loss of key personnel (Burger & Owens, 2013; Hager et al., 2004). Thornhill and Amit (2003) 
suggested that firm-specific failure determinants such as managerial deficiencies may trigger 
bankruptcy. 
The upper-echelon perspective explanations  
A stream of research anchored in the upper-echelon perspective (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) 
contends that organisational failures occur under the direction of top management teams (TMTs) 
and reflect imbalanced or inadequate expertise, inferior talent and disadvantageous social 
structure within the teams (D’Aveni, 1990; Platt & Platt, 2012). This stream of research 
highlights that top executives who are compositionally flawed are more likely to experience 
information processing deficiencies (Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1992). This then leads to strategic 
errors such as failure to gauge the seriousness of problems, and inability to identify market 
opportunities in a timely manner and respond to early warning signals of decline (Hambrick & 
D’Aveni, 1992). Studies indicate that strategic errors, miscalculations or blunders can be 
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attributed to team composition deficiencies (Nutt, 2002). These studies provide evidence of a 
link between top team characteristics and strategic error (Argenti, 1976; Nutt, 2002). A well-
developed literature has demonstrated that firm-specific factors such as poor decision-making 
processes, poor strategic execution and lack of managerial foresight are primary antecedents of 
organisational failure (D'Aveni, 1990; Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004; Moulton et al., 1996). 
Echoing these insights, Sheppard (1994a) examined the relationships between strategy and 
failure, and uncovered that, changes in business strategy to generate a turnaround, which are 
poorly formulated and executed by executives, may actually quicken the firm’s demise.  
In a related area, a line of research rooted in the organisational demography perspective (Pfeffer, 
1983; Carroll & Harrison, 1998) has uncovered that demographic attributes of team members 
such as quality and differences in human capital held, educational level and length of service in 
an organisation can contribute to organisational failure (e.g. Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1992). Past 
studies have uncovered that long tenure of top executives can lead to strategic persistence even 
in the face of changes in the business environment (Amankwah-Amoah, 2014b). Such strategy 
may create conditions which eventually precipitate the exit of the firms.  
A closely related stream of research has suggested that top managers can make a difference to 
the firm's survival. This is because their prestige influences the perceptions of important 
organisational stakeholders such as investors, shareholders and regulators, and their exit from 
financially troubled firms signals to stakeholders that the firm is no longer worthy of their 
support (D'Aveni, 1990; Sutton & Callahan, 1987; Semadeni, Cannella, Fraser & Lee, 2008). 
Indeed, the departure of the elite management team can undermine the legitimacy of the firm and 
its ability to attract stakeholders’ support and thereby precipitating exit (Sutton & Callahan, 
1987). A growing body of literature has demonstrated that factors such as over-widening 
ambition and weak management controls (Stead & Smallman, 1999), frequent changes in top 
management team (Amankwah-Amoah & Debrah, 2010), misallocation of resources and transfer 
of past bad practices (Amankwah-Amoah, 2014a) all contribute to the failure of firms.  
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Ecological explanations  
A voluminous stream of research anchored in the ecological perspective has uncovered that some 
firms are more likely to die than others due to liabilities of size, age and density (Burger & 
Owens, 2013; Carroll & Delacroix 1982; Hager et al., 2004; Hannan & Freeman, 1977, 1988; 
Hannan, 1988; Fafchamps & Owens, 2009). One of the most consistent findings in this area has 
been that younger firms are more likely to fail relative to older organisations (Stinchcombe, 
1965; Hager et al., 1996). Past studies have indicated that about 40% of new firms fail to survive 
past the first year of operations (Taylor, 1999) and above 60% fail to survive for five years 
(Kirchhoff, 1994). Headd (2003) reported that about two-thirds of all firms survive two years 
and one half of new firms survive beyond four years. A well-articulated explanation is rooted in 
the liabilities of “newness” and “smallness”, terms coined by organisational theorist, 
Stinchcombe (1965). This is based on a premise that young and small firms often lack legitimacy 
and resources due to their limited track record, knowledge and expertise about the marketplace 
which puts them at a competitive disadvantage relative to established and large firms (Singh, 
House & Tucker, 1986a; Singh, Tucker & House, 1986b).  
Largely due to their limited expertise, young firms are also forced to divert scarce resources 
away from operations to establish credibility and legitimacy in the eye of external stakeholders 
such as suppliers and customers (Carroll, 1983; Henderson, 1999). Such redirection of effort and 
resources has been identified as underpinning their high failure rate (Henderson, 1999). In 
addition, such new firms often exploit unproven and risky designs, strategies and technologies, 
which has been associated with their higher failure rates (Henderson, 1999). Prior research has 
shown that older and larger firms with greater networks of contacts and talented employees are 
more likely to improve their survival chances (Fafchamps & Owens, 2009; Hager et al., 2004). 
This stream of research has demonstrated that the risk of failure tends to decline with age as 
older firms gain more experience about the operating environment (Carroll & Delacroix, 1982; 
Singh et al., 1986a, b; Hager et al., 2004; Levinthal, 1991). Building on these findings, Thornhill 
and Amit (2003) uncovered that failure among younger firms can be attributed to deficiencies in 
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managerial knowledge and financial management abilities, whereas failure among older firms 
stems from inability to adapt to environmental change. Furthermore, young firms also lack slack 
financial resources which can buffer them against environmental challenges that threaten their 
survival (Bruderl & Schussler, 1990).  
Liabilities of ageing hypothesis 
An alternative explanation has been advanced by some scholars who have argued that new firms 
suffer from a liability of adolescence rather than a liability of newness (e.g. Fichman & 
Levinthal, 1991). The liability of adolescence perspective contends that largely due to initial 
stocks of assets and resource endowments, new firms are able to survive for a time with little risk 
of failure (Bruderl & Schussler, 1990; Henderson, 1999). The initial resources then act as a 
cushion against minor shocks in the environment and thereby creating an “initial honeymoon 
period” (Fichman & Levinthal, 1991; Henderson, 1999). Consequently, as the initial resources 
dwindle years after their founding, such firms face higher failure rate. Over time, depletion of the 
initial resources in tandem with inability to adapt would eventually lead to exit.  
Another school of thought is the liability of obsolescence which contends that failure rates 
increase as the firm ages (Barron, West & Hannan, 1994). Scholars have noted that “firms are 
highly inertial and tend to become increasingly misaligned with their environments” as they age 
(Henderson, 1999, p. 281; Barron et al., 1994). It has been uncovered that older and large firms 
are often bureaucratic and complex which then breeds inertia (Levinthal, 1991). This stifles their 
progress and ability to make necessary changes to respond to their environment which ultimately 
precipitates their decline and exit (Henderson, 1999). In an insightful study of the firms in the 
US personal computer industry, Henderson (1999) uncovered that firms that adopted proprietary 
strategists (i.e. use internally developed technologies) experienced liability of obsolescence, 
whereas firms that adopted the standards-based strategists (i.e. use technologies that conform 
with open and publicly available specifications) experienced a liability of adolescence. Based on 
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the above analysis, resource endowment and utilisation appears to provide a basis on which firms 
can mitigate the risk of failure.  
Going beyond the internal vs. external debate 
As intuitively appealing as both of the deterministic and voluntarist perspectives might be in 
insolation, there has been an accumulated body of literature that suggests that an integration of 
both factors offers a much more robust explanation of the causes of organisational failure (Carter 
& Van Auken, 2006; Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004; Pal, Medway & Byrom, 2006). Although the 
deterministic and voluntarist perspectives have some merits, each category of explanation in 
isolation offers only a limited picture of the causes of organisational failure. The review 
uncovered that a number of studies have integrated both perspectives to examine the causes of 
business failure (see Table 1, column 4). Indeed, there are also a myriad of case studies that have 
provided unique insights of firm-level and external factors leading to firm decline and exit 
(McGovern, 2007; Pal et al., 2006). On interactions, a nascent body of scholarly research has 
demonstrated that human capital decay (failure to update knowledge and expertise of decision-
makers/managers/employees) leads poor understanding of the external environment, resource 
misallocation, and misdirection of managerial attention (e.g. Amankwah-Amoah, 2015). Another 
bourgeoning body of scholarly works has suggested that poor information processes capability of 
decision-makers also leads to misallocation of resources and managerial attention (Amankwah-
Amoah, 2015; Irani, Sharif & Love, 2001). 
Stages of decline leading to failure 
A rich stream of research has consistently shown that the failure encompasses multiple stages of 
events, actions, inaction and responses. The process of decline can be seen as the shrinking and 
deterioration of resources and capabilities of the firm, which then causes it to lose legitimacy and 
ability to self-govern (Hager et al., 2004). According to Weitzel and Jonsson (1989, p. 94), 
“organizations enter the state of decline when they fail to anticipate, recognize, avoid, neutralize 
or adapt to external or internal pressures that threaten the organization's long-term survival.” The 
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review uncovered several stage models aimed at articulating the processes inherent in decline 
leading to failure (e.g. Sheppard & Chowdhury, 2005). For instance, Weitzel and Jonsson (1989) 
proposed a five-stage model of decline and generated different managerial implications for each 
stage. They contended that decline commences with “blinded management”; then “inaction”; 
followed by “faulty action”; then “crisis” and finally “dissolution”. Similarly, D’Aveni (1989) 
used the terms “sudden decline” and “gradual decline” to characterise the series of events that 
precipitate business exit. This view broadly emphasises early and late warning signals of decline 
leading to exit and managers’ failure to marshal adequate resources and expertise to respond to 
decline. Indeed, such managerial expertise and knowledge have been identified as essential 
ingredients in firms’ ability to scan their environment and timely upgrade obsolete routines, 
processes and resources in an attempt to mitigate failure (Cameron et al., 1988). Table 1 provides 
a summary of various studies that have offered a stage-based approach to the process of 
organisational decline leading to failure. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
Interestingly, however, studies have suggested that firms often have a substantial period of time 
to generate a turnaround before they fail (Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1988). Some firms can recover 
from a decline with a robust turnaround strategy to realign themselves with changes in the 
environment. However, others fail to adjust in a timely fashion and then enter “downward 
spirals” from which they do not escape (Cameron et al., 1988; Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1988). 
There is growing evidence, however, that human and social capital of top executives influenced 
the firm’s ability to slow down the pace of decline. D'Aveni (1990) suggested that failing firms’ 
attempts to improve their managerial prestige are sometimes hampered by “bailout”, where 
prestigious managers leave before their careers could be destroyed by the stigma of failure. It is 
worth noting that slack resources have been found to act as a buffer to cushion firms against 
sudden changes in the business environment (Levinthal, 1990). Firms lacking such critical 
resources may not be able to generate a downturn leading to untimely demise.  
 14 
Another argument that has been advanced in the literature suggests that governments often 
deploy additional resource to avert the decline of state-owned firms. Therefore, such firms are 
more likely to experience a protracted period of decline before eventual exit (Amankwah-Amoah 
& Debrah, 2014). Even as organisational death becomes inevitable, some studies have 
demonstrated that dying firms also perform functions such as parting ceremonies to provide a 
mechanism to support each other and reaffirm their bonds (Harris & Sutton, 1986; Walsh & 
Glynn, 2008). Other organisational leaders have sought divine intervention through prayers to 
avert failure in the eleventh hour (Amankwah-Amoah, 2014a). Although environmental changes 
affect all firms, some firms are more capable than others of using their resources and capabilities 
to reduce mortality rates (Bradley et al., 2010). Although it has been well established that firms 
go through various stages prior to exiting, there remains a lack of consensus on the exact 
processes of decline leading to exit. In light of the review of the literature on stages of decline 
leading to exit, the study offers a sequential process model of business failure (see Figure 2). As 
shown in the figure, there are broadly five key stages in business failure leading to cessation of 
the business. The phase model entails how early warning signals emerged and if left unattended 
may ultimately interact with other factors to bring about the demise of the firm. It also 
demonstrates that the transition from one phase to the next is often punctuated by a number of 
actions and inactions by managers. During the late stage, the firm entered a critical condition 
referred to as the “downward spirals” leading to exit. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
Research on the consequences of organisational failure  
This section sets out the literature on the consequences of organisational failure. In recent years, 
scholars have turned to biological analogies such as “parent-progeny” effects (Phillips, 2002) 
and “sins of the father” effects (Amankwah-Amoah, 2014a) to shed light on how the effects of 
business failure can diffuse from one firm to another. Some scholars have employed the term 
“legacy organizational identity” to refer to the collective claim by former employees of defunct 
firms to form a unique identify (Walsh & Glynn, 2008). Recent research shows that there are 
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broadly two main effects of business failure: the contagion and competitive effects (Akhigbe, 
Martin & Whyte, 2005; Lang & Stulz, 1992). 
The contagion effects  
The contagion effects contend that business failure unleashes a range of negative consequences 
for stakeholders such as employees, suppliers and shareholders (Lang & Stulz, 1992). This 
stream of research has identified effects such as loss of jobs stemming from failure, emotion and 
psychological burden that befall individuals (Shepherd, 2003, 2009; Byrne & Shepherd, 2015), 
diminished cumulative career advantages that befell former employees (Rider & Negro, 2015) 
and stigmatisation of individuals associated with failure (Goffman, 1963; Singh, Corner & 
Pavlovich, 2015; Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann & Hambrick, 2008). In much of the developing world, 
individuals involved in business failure are often labelled as “incompetent”, “squanderers”, 
“deceivers” and “cheaters” (see also Efrat, 2006b).  
Another line of research has suggested that there is often a feeling of grief and loss of self-
esteem after business failure as some former business owners come to the conclusion that they 
have personally failed in an area where they have made personal and financial commitments 
(Jenkins, Wiklund & Brundin, 2014). Historically, individuals have been subject to harsh 
treatment such as prohibition from holding public office, imprisonment and death as a 
consequence of business failure (Efrat, 2006b). In addition to the punishment of failure within 
the ambit of the law, society also delivered its own chastisement through public humiliation and 
stigmatisation (Sandage, 2005). This “baggage” which stems from past experience of failure and 
the fear of failure for a generation discouraged and hampered entrepreneurial activities (Efrat, 
2006a, b; Isenberg, 2011).  
Recent research has shown that the stigma surround failure has weakened (Evans & Borders, 
2014; Sandage, 2005). One reason for the shift has been that society has come to accept that 
“failure might arise from risk rather than sin” (Kurunmäki & Miller, 2013, p. 1103). In the 
contemporary entrepreneurship literature, studies have indicated that the changing societal 
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perception and fading stigma of bankruptcy now provides more opportunities and space for 
individuals to start new businesses after failure (Shepherd & Haynie, 2011). Scholars have also 
come to recognise what Efrat (2002) referred to as the “fresh start” policy after business failure. 
This is where countries increasingly provide more opportunities for some businesses to recover 
after failure. One significant feature has been the evolution of laws and regulations exemplified 
by Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the US (Evans & Green, 2000; Ma, 2001).  
Interestingly enough, there has been a shift from the “old-fashioned sense” of failure where 
failed companies immediately closed doors and cleared out shop-floors, towards a more tolerant 
view where opportunities are provided for former employees to recover (Shepherd & Haynie, 
2011). Isenberg (2011, p. 36) succinctly summarised the current challenges and the changing 
attitudes towards failure by noting that: “many countries, even those with advanced economies, 
inadvertently discourage entrepreneurship by punishing bankruptcy. They prevent failed 
entrepreneurs from conducting future business or even opening bank accounts, and in some cases 
treat bankruptcy as a crime”. One recent and promising stream of research has suggested that 
when firms die, their faulty resources, routines and processes can be transferred to existing firms 
through personnel mobility (Phillips, 2002; Ferriani, Garnsey & Lorenzoni, 2012). Eventually, 
this often leads to performance decline and the exit of some firms (Phillips, 2002). One school of 
thought – the spillover theory of business failure (Platt, 1989; Akhigbe, Martin & Whyte, 2005) 
– argues that business failure in one industry has the potential to precipitate the demise of firms 
in other industries. Platt’s (1989, p. 107) study uncovered that “for vertically integrated 
industries, failure rates of selling industries are positively associated with failure rates in buying 
industries”.  
The competitive effect 
The competitive effect contends that business failure is some kind of beneficial environmental 
jolt which unleashes waves of positive effects to be tapped by existing firms. The demise of an 
incumbent creates competitive space for rival firms as well as enlarges the market opportunities 
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for the population of firms within an industry (Carter & Van Auken, 2006). One stream of 
research has identified the diffusion of knowledge of skilled employees from departed to existing 
firms as one of the major consequences of business failure (Knott & Posen, 2005; Hoetker & 
Agarwal, 2007). This line of thinking suggests that failure enables firms to acquire top talent 
cheaply rather than incurring astronomical training costs in some industries. As such, the failure 
of a major firm in the industry provides the opportunity for others to acquire ready-made talent 
(Isenberg, 2011). More firms have come to view others’ failure as an opportunity to tap 
customers released by the departed firm (Delacroix & Carroll, 1983; Pe’er & Vertinsky, 2008) 
and benefit from the sudden decrease in the number of competitors (Carter & Van Auken, 2006).  
Another stream of research has suggested that business failure also provides a wake-up 
opportunity for firms to learn from others’ misfortunes (Shepherd, 2003), higher stock returns 
and new customer orders (Lang & Stulz, 1992). A recent study also indicates that firms are more 
likely to learn more from failure than success (Desai, 2011). The existing streams of scholarly 
works, however, provide us with few insights into factors that prompt a firm to seek to recruit 
employees of failed firms. Future study could enrich our understanding of this phenomenon. For 
decades, firms have sought to avert failure by distancing themselves from failed rivals and allies 
as a means of improving their chances of success. Yet, one active line of contemporary research 
has suggested that firms can benefit from others’ failure by luring competent former employers 
to help improve their processes (Amankwah-Amoah, 2013).  
Discussion and conclusion 
The study sought to review and synthesise the literature on the antecedents and consequences of 
organisational failure. In so doing, we advanced an integrative process model of the antecedents, 
stages of decline leading to failure and consequences of organisational failure. The study 
demonstrated multiple accomplishments and progress made in enhancing our understanding of 
the subject. As the review has shown, some scholars have focused on the prolonged debate about 
whether the causes of failure can be attributed to internal or external factors. Business failure 
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may stem from firm-specific (endogenous) and external environmental (exogenous) factors. One 
promising development in the literature is an emerging consensus that businesses often failed 
due to interaction of firm-specific and external factors. The review indicates that the integrated 
approach offers a more robust explanation of the causes of failure.  
Although most studies have focused on the causes of failure, there has been a fundamental shift 
towards examining the consequences of organisational failure. In this direction, studies have 
uncovered two broad categories of effects, i.e. the contagion and competitive effects. In addition, 
there has also been a shift from viewing business failure as mainly having negative outcomes 
towards exploring how failure provides opportunities for other firms to learn and benefit from 
others’ misfortunes (Knott & Posen, 2005). The paper has shown that research on the subject has 
grown and continues to delve further into more complex issues such as how existing firms can 
capture the positive effects of failure.  
Contributions and directions for future research 
The paper makes key contributions to the business strategy, organisation studies and 
organisational failure literature. First, in spite of the perennial interest in the subject, the lack of 
integration has obscured the progress made by scholars. By reviewing the literature in an 
integrative manner across multiple disciplines, the study offers paths towards a better 
understanding of the antecedents, stages of decline and consequences of organisational failure. 
Thus, the study responds to the call by Mellahi and Wilkinson (2010) for a more integrated 
approach to fragmented literature that has hindered the past accomplishments. Another way that 
this study differs from and extends past research is that it brings further clarity on the current 
state of knowledge with regard to some of the fundamental questions such as “why do firms 
fail?” and “what happens when firms fail?”.  
The study suggests a number of fruitful avenues that can be pursued to further enrich our 
understanding of the subject. First of all, a promising avenue lies in exploring whether 
stigmatisation after business failure fades away with the passage of time. Such analysis could 
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provide further insight into the long-term effects of business failure as well as shed light on how 
both positive and negative attributions manifest after failure. These relationships have been 
largely overlooked by the existing streams of research. Future research should seek to examine 
how organisations can benefit from others’ failure without exposing themselves to the contagion 
effects. Another possible direction would be to examine whether the pace of decline affects other 
firms’ ability to capture the positive externalities of failure. Notwithstanding the above important 
insights, there has been a conspicuous lack of clarity in this area which warrants further scholarly 
attention. In contrast to the copious research on the causes on organisational failure, limited 
attention has been paid to the interactive effects of the internal and external factors. An important 
next step would be to examine the mechanisms through which sudden changes in the external 
environment can cause firms’ level of expertise and knowledge to become obsolete, leading to 
business failure.  
From a practical standpoint, the findings suggest the need for firms to proactively scan their 
environment in order to identify early warning signals of decline to help avert collapse. Despite 
the benefits of learning from the experiences of other firms (Baumard & Starbuck, 2005), there 
remains an unwillingness on the part of existing firms to recruit former employees of collapsed 
companies. As such, often former employees’ knowledge decays with the passage of time. The 
study highlights the inherent benefits of learning from other firms’ failures to not only improve 
firms’ competiveness but also to avoid falling into the same trap. These observations also 
suggest that strategies to learn from failure can facilitate the diffusion of useful knowledge from 
the departed firm to existing firms. By articulating key features of the subject, we hope this study 
would help foster a much better informed discussion and ignite further research on the subject.  
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Figure 1: An integrative process framework of organisational failure research 
 
 
 
Figure 2: A sequential process of organisational failure 
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Appendix: Summary of some empirical research on organisational failure  
Studies/Year Level of 
Analysis 
Data source  Theoretical 
Lens 
Key findings 
Amankwah-
Amoah & 
Debrah (2010) 
Antecedents  A case study of a state-owned 
airline: Ghana Airways. 
IO and OS   External and internal factors such as liberalisation and 
frequent changes to the top-management team contributed 
significantly to failure. 
Amankwah-
Amoah & 
Debrah (2014) 
Antecedents A collapse of Air Afrique. IO and OS  Failure stems from conflicting interests of the multiple 
stakeholders and inability to respond to sudden changes in 
the business environment. 
Baum &  
Mezias (1992) 
Antecedents  Failures in the Manhattan hotel 
industry from 1898 to 1990. 
DBM   Firms located in densely populated regions of firms 
experience significantly higher failure rates. 
Carter & Van 
Auken (2006) 
Antecedents  Compared 57 bankrupt small firms 
to 55 non-bankrupt firms. 
OF   The most serious problems of bankrupt firms can be 
condensed into three categories: lack of knowledge, 
inaccessibility to debt and economic climate. 
D’Aveni & 
MacMillan 
(1990) 
Antecedents  57 bankrupt firms and 57 matched 
survivors. 
OF and CM   Failing firms deny crises and avoid focusing on long-term 
problems because of short-run resource constraints and 
threat-rigidity response. 
Hambrick & 
D’Aveni 
(1988) 
Antecedents  57 large bankruptcies and 57 
matched survivors from 
manufacturing, retail and 
transportation firms. 
OF and UET    Failing firms tend to engage in vacillating or widely 
swinging strategic behaviours. Decision makers often 
delude themselves into believing that a problem does not 
exist or that it is not serious.  
Hambrick & 
D’Aveni 
Antecedents  
 
57 large bankruptcies and 57 
matched survivors from publicly 
UET  Deterioration of the top-management team is a central 
element of the downward spiral of large corporate 
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(1992) traded firms filing bankruptcy 
petitions during 1972–1982. 
failures. Team deficiencies bring about corporate 
deterioration either through strategic errors or stakeholder 
uneasiness with the flawed team.  
D'Aveni 
(1990) 
Antecedents 
and 
consequences  
57 large bankrupt firms and 57 
matched firms selected from 
industries in the US economy from 
1972 to 1982. 
UET  Failing firms are often unable to hold onto gains because 
of the "bailout" (where prestigious managers leave before 
their careers are destroyed by the stigma of failure) in the 
last two years before bankruptcy. 
Hamilton 
(2006) 
Antecedents  
 
Three American firms: Enron, 
ValuJet and Arthur Andersen, LLP. 
OF   Loss of legitimacy identified as major factor in business 
failure.  
Hollow (2014) Antecedents The case of the Birkbeck Bank Strategic 
inertia 
 Inability to adapt and respond to market conditions and 
change in a timely manner ultimately precipitated its 
demise. 
McGovern 
(2007) 
Antecedents  A case study of the Decline of 
Dunlop. 
IO and OS   Management failed to develop appropriate strategies to 
jolts which led to large losses in an industry suffering 
from overcapacity. 
Moulton, 
Thomas  &  
Pruett  (1996) 
Antecedents  Compared 73 firms that declared 
bankruptcy from 1980 to 1986 with 
the behaviour of 73 matching 
surviving firms over the same 
period. 
IO, EO and 
OS 
 Although firms failed under all possible combinations of 
firm and industry growth or decline, this study found that 
more failed in growing than declining industries. Debt-
funded, forced-growth strategies create a high risk of 
failure regardless of industry growth rate. 
Pal et al. 
(2006) 
Antecedents  A case study of A. Goldberg & 
Sons Plc.  
IO and OS    Various internal and external pressures including over-
expansion into new retail space and the general economic 
downturn contributed to failure. 
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Sheppard 
(1994) 
Antecedents  
 
Commerce Clearinghouse Capital 
Changes Reporter for companies 
which declared bankruptcy during 
the period 1980 to 1987. 
The IO   The financial resources of failed firms were weaker than 
their surviving counterparts for a long period of time (up 
to five years) prior to actual bankruptcy.  
Singh, Corner 
& Pavlovich 
(2015) 
Antecedents 
and 
consequences 
Based on 12 cases of 
entrepreneurial failures in New 
Zealand. 
Failure 
stigmatisation 
 The process of stigmatisation often commences “before, 
not after” business failure has occurred. 
Thornhill & 
Amit (2003) 
Antecedents  Data from 339 Canadian corporate 
bankruptcies. 
RBV  Younger firms fail due to deficiencies in managerial 
knowledge and financial management abilities. However, 
failure among older firms stems from inability to adapt to 
environmental change.  
Note: In the Theoretical Lens column: OF: Organisational failure; OL: Organisational learning; OK: Organisational knowledge; KS: Knowledge spillover/diffusion; AT: Agency 
theory; RBV: Resource-based view; TL: Turnaround literature; PT: Prospect theory; UET: Upper echelon theory; PET: Population ecology theory; SAP: Selection and adaptation 
perspectives; OE: Organisational ecology; NE: Neoclassical economics; TCE: Transaction cost economic; IO: The industrial organisation; OS: Organisation studies; OC: 
Organisational crisis; DBM: Density-based models of inter-organisational competition; CM: Crisis management. 
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Table 1: Comparison of stage perspectives of organisational failure 
Study  Stage characteristics 
Mellahi (2005)  The stages include conception, warning signals, rebellion and 
collapse stage. 
Sheppard and 
Chowdhury (2005) 
 A four-stage model (i.e. decline; response initiation; transition; 
outcome) is used to describe the trajectory which leads to failure 
or turnaround.  
Amankwah-Amoah 
and  Debrah (2014) 
 The stages identified include golden age; Africanisation; 
escalating indecision; escalating commitment; and dissolution. 
D’Aveni (1989)   “Sudden decline” and “gradual decline” are two types of decline 
leading to exit. 
Weitzel and Jonsson 
(1989)  
 Proposed a five-stage model of decline which commences with 
“blinded management”; then “inaction”; followed by “faulty 
action”; then “crisis” and finally “dissolution”. 
 
 
